Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces Read online

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  The spetsnaz agent who is recruited to provide support for the

  operations of fighting groups in the way I have described, by acquiring a

  house andor transport feels he is quite safe. The local police would have

  tremendous difficulty trying to run him to earth. Even if he were to be

  found and arrested it would be practically impossible to prove his guilt.

  But what the agent does not know is that danger threatens him from spetsnaz

  itself. Officers in the GRU who are discontented with the Communist regime

  may, either as a mark of protest or for other reasons, defect to the West.

  When they do, they are free to identify agents, including spetsnaz agents.

  Equally, once he has carried out his act of terrorism, the spetsnaz commando

  will destroy all traces of its work and any witnesses, including the agent

  who protected or helped the group in the first place. A man who is recruited

  as an agent to back up a commando group very rarely realises what will

  happen to him afterwards.

  Thus if it is relatively easy to recruit a man to act as a `sleeper',

  what about recruiting a foreigner to act as a real terrorist, prepared to

  commit murder, use explosives and fire buildings? Surely that is much more

  difficult?

  The answer is that, surprisingly, it is not. A spetsnaz officer out to

  recruit agents for direct terrorist action has a wonderful base for his work

  in the West. There are a tremendous number of people who are discontented

  and ready to protest against absolutely anything. And while millions protest

  peacefully, some individuals will resort to any means to make their protest.

  The spetsnaz officer has only to find the malcontent who is ready to go to

  extremes.

  A man who protests against the presence of American troops in Europe

  and sprays slogans on walls is an interesting subject. If he not only paints

  slogans but is also prepared to fire at an American general, should he be

  given the sub-machine gun or an RPG-7 grenade-launcher to do the job, he is

  an exceptionally interesting person. His goals tally perfectly with those of

  the senior officers of the GRU.

  In France protesters fired an RPG-7 grenade-launcher at the reactor of

  a nuclear power station. Where they got the Soviet-made weapon I do not

  know. Perhaps it was just lying there at the roadside. But if it was a

  spetsnaz officer who had the good fortune to meet those people and provide

  them with their hardware, he would without further ado have been given a Red

  Banner medal and promotion. The senior officers of the GRU have a particular

  dislike of Western nuclear power stations, which reduce the West's

  dependence on imported oil (including Soviet oil) and make it stronger and

  more independent. They are one of spetsnaz's most important targets.

  On another occasion a group of animal rights activists in the UK

  injected bars of chocolate with poison. If spetsnaz were able to contact

  that group, and there is every chance it might, it would be extremely keen

  (without, of course, mentioning its name) to suggest to them a number of

  even more effective ways of protesting. Activists, radicals, peace

  campaigners, green party members: as far as the leaders of the GRU are

  concerned, these are like ripe water-melons, green on the outside, but red

  on the inside -- and mouth-watering.

  So there is a good base for recruiting. There are enough discontented

  people in the West who are ready not only to kill others but also to

  sacrifice their own lives for the sake of their own particular ideals which

  spetsnaz may exploit. The spetsnaz officer has only to find and take

  advantage of the malcontent who is ready to go to extremes.

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  The spetsnaz network of agents has much in common with international

  terrorism, a common centre, for example -- yet they are different things and

  must not be confused. It would be foolhardy to claim that international

  terrorism came into being on orders from Moscow. But to claim that, without

  Moscow's support, international terrorism would never have assumed the scale

  it has would not be rash. Terrorism has been born in a variety of

  situations, in various circumstances and in different kinds of soil. Local

  nationalism has always been a potent source, and the Soviet Union supports

  it in any form, just as it offers concrete support to extremist groups

  operating within nationalist movements. Exceptions are made, of course, of

  the nationalist groups within the Soviet Union and the countries under its

  influence.

  If groups of extremists emerge in areas where there is no sure Soviet

  influence, you may be sure that the Soviet Union will very shortly be their

  best friend. In the GRU alone there are two independent and very powerful

  bodies dealing with questions relating to extremists and terrorists. First,

  there is the 3rd Direction of the GRU which studies terrorist organisations

  and ways of penetrating them. Then there is the 5th Directorate which is in

  charge of all intelligence-gathering at lower levels, including that of

  spetsnaz.

  The GRU's tactics toward terrorists are simple: never give them any

  orders, never tell them what to do. They are destroying Western

  civilisation: they know how to do it, the argument goes, so let them get on

  with it unfettered by petty supervision. Among them there are idealists

  ready to die for their own ideas. So let them die for them. The most

  important thing is to preserve their illusion that they are completely free

  and independent.

  Moscow is an important centre of international terrorism, not because

  it is from Moscow that instructions are issued, but because selected

  terrorist groups or organisations which ask for help may be given it if

  little risk is attached to doing so. Moscow's deep involvement with

  terrorism is a serious political affair. One `resistance movement' has to

  have more financial help, another less. One `Red Army' must have modern

  weapons and an unlimited supply of ammunition, another one will do better

  with old weapons and a limited supply of ammunition. One movement is to be

  recognised, while another will be condemned in words but supported in

  practice. `Independent' terrorists give little thought to where the money

  comes from with which they travel the countries of the world, or who

  provides the Kalashnikov submachine-guns and the cartridges to go with them,

  or who supplies the instructors who teach them and train them.

  But just look at the `independent' Palestinians: they virtually throw

  their ammunition away. And if one watches a film about the fighting in

  Afghanistan and then one from the streets of Beirut the difference is very

  striking. The Afghan resistance fighters count every round, whereas the

  groups fighting each other in the streets of Beirut don't even bother to aim

  when they fire; they simply fire into the air in long bursts, although it

  means they are wasting someone else's money. Whose money is it?

  When I was beginning my military service I was taught to count every

  round. Cartridges are metal and a lot of hard work. It is more difficult and

  more expensive
to make a cartridge than to make a fountain pen. And another

  reason for being careful with ammunition is so that you are never without it

  at a critical moment. Supplying an army with ammunition is a complex

  logistical problem. If the transport carrying ammunition arrives even a few

  minutes after you have spent all your ammunition without thinking, then you

  are dead. But there are no such problems in Beirut. Nobody tells the

  conflicting groups what the ammunition costs. Nobody tells them the cost of

  the lives they cut off every day. Nobody mentions the danger that the

  regular supply of ammunition may be late. The suppliers are certain that it

  will not be late.

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  The Soviet Union condemns the civil war in the Lebanon. But there is no

  need for it to condemn the war. All it has to do is hold back the next

  transport of ammunition, and war will cease.

  Apart from military and financial support, the Soviet Union also

  provides the terrorists aid in the form of training. Training centres have

  been set up in the Soviet Union for training terrorists from a number of

  different countries. Similar centres have been set up in the countries of

  Eastern Europe, in Cuba and elsewhere. I know the centre in Odessa very

  well. Officially it belongs to the 10th Chief Directorate of the General

  Staff which deals with the export of weapons, sends Soviet military advisers

  to foreign countries and trains foreigners to be fighters and terrorists. In

  the early 1960s this centre was a branch of the higher infantry officers

  school. An intelligence faculty was formed in it for Soviet students, many

  of whom ended up in the GRU and spetsnaz, while the remainder of the huge

  area, classrooms and living quarters, was given over entirely to the centre

  for training foreign fighters. When I was in Odessa most of the people under

  training were intended for work in black Africa. Not all of them came from

  Africa, quite a lot of them were from Cuba, but that was where the majority

  were destined. The difference between the training and the living conditions

  of the Soviet and the foreign students was tremendous.

  The foreigners were better fed and wore Soviet officers' field

  uniforms, though without any badges of rank. They had practically no

  theoretical tuition at all. But their practical training was very

  concentrated, even by Soviet standards. For them there was no shortage of

  ammunition. Shooting went on in their camp day and night.

  The foreigners were kept in strict isolation. The only outsiders who

  could see them were the Soviet students and then only through the barbed

  wire. The total isolation had a bad effect on some of the foreign students.

  But since they could not break out of it, the Cuban minister of defence

  stepped in and ordered some girls to be sent from Cuba who were trained as

  nurses for partisan units at the Odessa centre. It was interesting to note

  that the soldiers were under training for one year and the officers for two

  years, but the nurses' training lasted ten years or more. At the end of

  their training the nurses were sent back to Cuba and some younger ones were

  sent to replace them. There were no more psychological problems at the

  training centre.

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  Foreigners belonging to `liberation movements' who turn up in the

  Soviet Union are not generally recruited by the Soviet intelligence

  services. Experience has shown that the terrorist who considers himself

  independent and who kills people because of his own beliefs is more

  effective than the one who fights on the orders of other people. For his own

  ideas the terrorist will take risks and sacrifice his life, but he is

  scarcely likely to do so merely on instructions from foreigners. So why

  recruit him?

  But there are important exceptions. Every terrorist is studied

  carefully during his training, and among them will be noted the potential

  leaders and the born rebels who will not submit to any authority. Of equal

  importance are the students' weaknesses and ambitions, and their

  relationships with one another. Some time, many years ahead, one of them may

  become an important leader, but not one approved by Moscow, so it is vital

  to know in advance who his likely friends and enemies will be.

  As the students are themselves studied during training, some emerge as

  exceptions among the crowd and as likely material for recruitment.

  Recruitment at the training centres is carried on simultaneously by two

  different GRU organisations. The 3rd Direction recruits informers, who will

  subsequently remain inside the `national liberation movements' and will pass

  on to the heads of the GRU the internal secrets of the movements. The 5th

  Directorate of the GRU recruits some of the students to be part of the

  spetsnaz network of agents. This is a fairly complicated process. Formally

  the candidate remains in his `liberation movement' and works there. In fact

  he starts to operate on instructions from the GRU. It is a very delicate

  situation and all possible steps are taken to protect the reputation of the

  USSR in case of failure. With this aim in view the carefully selected

  candidate, unaware of his position, is transferred to training in one of the

  countries under Soviet influence. Recruitment then takes place, but not by

  Soviet Intelligence, rather by the Intelligence service of one of the Soviet

  satellite countries.

  The recruitment of a full-blown terrorist is a very different matter

  from the recruitment of an informer-agent. The terrorist has to go through

  very tough training which becomes a daily, and a nightly nightmare. He

  dreams of the training coming to an end: he yearns for the real thing. The

  instructors talk to him and ask him what he would like, as a terrorist, to

  do. The terrorist tells them. The instructors then `think about it' and a

  few days later tell him it is not possible. The torture of the training

  continues. Again the question of what he wants to do is raised, and again he

  is turned down. Various reasons are given for refusing him: we value your

  life too highly to send you on such a risky mission; such an act might have

  unwanted repercussions on your family, your comrades, and so on. Thus the

  range of choice is gradually narrowed down until the terrorist suggests

  exactly what the heads of Soviet Military intelligence want. They `think

  about it' for a few days and finally give their agreement in such a way that

  it does not appear to be something wanted by the GRU but rather a compromise

  or a concession to the terrorist: if he really thinks it necessary to do it,

  no obstacles will be put in his way.

  I have of course simplified a process which is in practice a very

  complicated affair.

  The reward for the GRU is that a terrorist doing work for spetsnaz does

  not, in the great majority of cases, suspect he is being used. He is utterly

  convinced that he is acting independently, of his own will and by his own

  choice. The GRU does not leave its signature or his fingerprints around.

  Even in cases where it is not a question of individual terrorists but

  of experienced leaders of terrorist organisations,
the GRU takes

  extraordinary steps to ensure that not only all outsiders but even the

  terrorist leader himself should not realise the extent of his subordination

  to spetsnaz and consequently to the GRU. The leader of the terrorists has a

  vast field of action and a wide choice. But there are operations and acts of

  terrorism on which spetsnaz will spend any amount of money, will provide any

  kind of weapon, will help in obtaining passports and will organise hiding

  places. But there are also terrorist acts for which spetsnaz has no money,

  no weapons, no reliable people and no hiding places. The leader of the

  terrorists is at complete liberty to choose the mission he wants, but

  without weapons, money and other forms of support his freedom to choose is

  suddenly severely curtailed.

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  Chapter 9. Weapons and Equipment

  The standard issue of weapons to a spetsnaz is a sub-machine gun, 400

  rounds of ammunition, a knife, and six hand grenades or a light

  single-action grenade-launcher. During a drop by parachute the sub-machine

  gun is carried in such a way as not to interfere with the main (or the

  reserve) parachute opening correctly and promptly, and not to injure the

  parachute on landing. But the large number of fastenings make it impossible

  for the parachutist to use the gun immediately after landing. So he should

  not be left defenceless at that moment, the parachutist also carries a P-6

  silent pistol. After my escape to the West I described this pistol to

  Western experts and was met with a certain scepticism. Today a great deal

  that I told the experts has been confirmed, and examples of the silent

  pistol have been found in Afghanistan. (Jane's Defence Weekly has published

  some excellent photographs and a description of this unusual weapon.) For

  noiseless shooting over big distances PBS silencers are used and some

  soldiers carry them on their submachine guns.

  Officers, radio-operators and cypher clerks have a smaller set of

  weapons: a short-barrelled sub-machine gun (AKR) of 160 rounds, a pistol and

  a knife.

  Apart from personal weapons a spetsnaz group carries collective weapons

  in the form of RPG-16D grenade-launchers, Strela-2 ground-to-air missiles,

  mines for various purposes, plastic explosive, snipers' rifles and other

  weapons. The unit learns how to handle group weapons but does not keep them